Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-68880-8_17MaRDI QIDQ3511426zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe

Publication date 10 July 2008

Published in Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1802/4630

zbMATH Keywords

Computational social choice theorymultiagent systemspreference aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
• Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes
• Guarantees for the Success Frequency of an Algorithm for Finding Dodgson-Election Winners
• How hard is it to control an election?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1161563 (Why is no real title available?)
• Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• On Approximating Optimal Weighted Lobbying, and Frequency of Correctness Versus Average-Case Polynomial Time
• The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cited in

(14)

• Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
• Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
• How hard is it to control an election?
• The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
• A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
• Tennis manipulation: can we help Serena Williams win another tournament? Or can we control a knockout tournament with reasonable complexity?
• Gerrymandering on graphs: computational complexity and parameterized algorithms
• Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
• Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
• Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
• Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
• Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery
• Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
• Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems

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