Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
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Recommendations
- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
- Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
Cites work
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to control an election?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1095171 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1161563 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2234775 (Why is no real title available?)
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Multimode control attacks on elections
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Parametrized complexity theory.
- Perfect Code is \(W[1]\)-complete
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Cited in
(21)- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- On the parameterized complexity of party nominations
- Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- On the computational complexity of variants of combinatorial voter control in elections
- Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
- Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
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