Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
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Cited in
(34)- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Reallocating multiple facilities on the line
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
- Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications
- Strategic voting in negotiating teams
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
- A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda
- The give-up problem for blocked regional lists with multi-winners
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Candidate coalitions and strategic manipulation in multi-winner elections: an evaluation of committee scoring rules
- On the complexity of destructive bribery in approval-based multiwinner voting
- On the complexity of winner determination and strategic control in conditional approval voting
- On the parameterized complexity of controlling amendment and successive winners
- Manipulation with(out) money in matching market
- Complexity of candidate control for single nontransferable vote and bloc voting
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