Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?

DOI10.2307/2689846MaRDI QIDQ4199791zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Samuel III Merrill

Publication date 1979

Published in Mathematics Magazine (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2689846

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingdecision analysisexpected utilityvoting system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Utility theory (91B16) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cited in

(2)

• Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
• Behavioral heterogeneity under approval and plurality voting

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