Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?

DOI10.2307/2689846zbMath0412.90005OpenAlexW4242884548MaRDI QIDQ4199791

Samuel III Merrill

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Mathematics Magazine (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2689846

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilitydecision analysisvoting systemapproval voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

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Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation ⋮ Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting

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