Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
- Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
Cited in
(11)- Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and proportional lottery rules
- Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
- On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey
- Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates
- On probability models in voting theory
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