Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation

DOI10.1007/BF00133974zbMATH Open0482.90006MaRDI QIDQ1162902FDOQ1162902

Authors: Peter Fishburn, William V. Gehrlein 

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

voting proceduresmulticandidate election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
• Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?

Cited In (11)

• Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and proportional lottery rules
• Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
• On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
• Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
• The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey
• Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates
• On probability models in voting theory

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