Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.4204/eptcs.379.20arXiv2210.15181OpenAlexW4383645821MaRDI QIDQ6199613

Moshe Tennenholtz, Yotam Gafni

Publication date: 28 February 2024

Published in: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.15181

zbMATH Keywords

optimal mechanism designcombinatorial auction(DSL) strategiesdiscrete first--price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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