Information aggregation with runoff voting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1995290
Recommendations
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
- Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
- Majority rule when voters like to win
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
- Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
- Voting as Communicating
Cited in
(9)- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Information aggregation in Poisson elections
- Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
- Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
- Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
- Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
- Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
- Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
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