Information aggregation with runoff voting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105130zbMATH Open1460.91083OpenAlexW2972705635MaRDI QIDQ1995290FDOQ1995290

Dimitrios Xefteris, Nikolas Tsakas

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/09-19.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

electionsinformation aggregationrunoff votingCondorcet jury theoremsequential eliminationpartisan voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
• Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
• Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• Voting as Communicating

Cited In (4)

• Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
• Information aggregation in Poisson elections
• Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
• Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory

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