Pivots versus signals in elections

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.08.008zbMATH Open1160.91327OpenAlexW2134275390MaRDI QIDQ1007329FDOQ1007329

Authors: Adam Meirowitz, Kenneth W. Shotts 

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.008

Recommendations

• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• A signaling model of repeated elections
• Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes
• Voting as a signaling device
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

zbMATH Keywords

informationelectionsvotingsignalingpivot

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• A Note on Quantiles in Large Samples
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Asymptotic Normality of Sample Quantiles for $m$-Dependent Processes
• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Voting as Communicating
• A signaling model of repeated elections
• The almost sure representation of intermediate order statistics

Cited In (18)

• The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
• A signaling model of repeated elections
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Lying for votes
• Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
• Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections
• Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
• How do Campaigns Shape Vote Choice? Multicountry Evidence from 62 Elections and 56 TV Debates
• The swing voter's curse in the laboratory
• An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens
• A passion for voting
• A theory of decisive leadership
• Fairness and voting
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes
• Ties
• Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
• Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

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