Pivots versus signals in elections

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.008zbMath1160.91327OpenAlexW2134275390MaRDI QIDQ1007329

Kenneth W. Shotts, Adam Meirowitz

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

electionssignalinginformationvotingpivot

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens ⋮ Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections

Cites Work

• A signaling model of repeated elections
• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• The almost sure representation of intermediate order statistics
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Voting as Communicating
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• A Note on Quantiles in Large Samples
• Asymptotic Normality of Sample Quantiles for $m$-Dependent Processes

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