Enforcement missions: targets vs budgets

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.04.005MaRDI QIDQ994073zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sandeep Kapur, Anthony G. Heyes

Publication date 17 September 2010

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/1957/1/1957.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

enforcementpolicy delegationregulatory missions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Community enforcement with observation costs
• Enforcement and over-compliance
• Information and targeted spending
• Budgets as Dynamic Gatekeepers
• The use of costless inspection in enforcement
• Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations.

Cites work

• Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation in the U. S. steel industry
• The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information
• The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities

Cited in

(1)

• Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations.

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