Enforcement missions: targets vs budgets

DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.005zbMath1194.91143OpenAlexW2079259561MaRDI QIDQ994073

Sandeep Kapur, Anthony G. Heyes

Publication date: 17 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/1957/1/1957.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

enforcementpolicy delegationregulatory missions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information
• Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation in the U. S. steel industry
• The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities

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