Manipulated electorates and information aggregation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ019zbMATH Open1437.91170OpenAlexW2187484857WikidataQ127706508 ScholiaQ127706508MaRDI QIDQ5110012FDOQ5110012

Authors: Mehmet Ekmekci, Stephan Lauermann 

Publication date: 14 May 2020

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz019

Recommendations

• Coordination and turnout in large elections
• Large elections and interim turnout
• Information aggregation in Poisson elections
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?

zbMATH Keywords

votinginformation aggregationpolitical economyelection design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (9)

• Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
• How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
• Public information and electoral bias
• Manufacturing Consent
• Large elections and interim turnout
• When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
• Full information equivalence in large elections

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