Random assignments and outside options

DOI10.1007/S00355-021-01328-9MaRDI QIDQ2058870zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Caterina Calsamiglia, Francisco Martínez-Mora, Antonio Miralles

Publication date 10 December 2021

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01328-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes

Cited in

(1)

• Ordinal simplicity in discrete mechanism design

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