The Manipulability of Voting Systems
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Publication:4417723
DOI10.2307/2695497zbMath1049.91040OpenAlexW4231420492WikidataQ56212390 ScholiaQ56212390MaRDI QIDQ4417723
Publication date: 29 July 2003
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2695497
Related Items (9)
Data aggregation and Simpson's paradox gauged by index numbers ⋮ On the equivalence of the HEX game theorem and the Duggan-Schwartz theorem for strategy-proof social choice correspondences ⋮ An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences ⋮ Merging epistemic states and manipulation ⋮ Manipulability of consular election rules ⋮ Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions ⋮ Sensitivity analyses and measurements for group decisions using weighted scoring rules ⋮ On manipulation in merging epistemic states ⋮ Knowledge, Games and Tales from the East
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