On the equivalence of the HEX game theorem and the Duggan-Schwartz theorem for strategy-proof social choice correspondences
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Publication:2371435
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Cites work
- Equivalence of the HEX game theorem and the Arrow impossibility theorem
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Game of Hex and the Brouwer Fixed-Point Theorem
- The Manipulability of Voting Systems
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