Politicians, taxes and debt

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00584.XMaRDI QIDQ3563644zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre Yared

Publication date 1 June 2010

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00584.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(6)

• Political power and the credibility of government debt
• Power fluctuations and political economy
• Two differential games between rent-seeking politicians and capitalists: implications for economic growth
• Intergenerational risk shifting through social security and bailout politics
• Fiscal policy over the real business cycle: a positive theory
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions

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