Government debt, budget surplus, and popularity of politicians
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Cites work
- Continuation techniques and interactive software for bifurcation analysis of ODEs and iterated maps
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3991198 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4098590 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3743640 (Why is no real title available?)
- Limit cycles in intertemporal adjustment models. Theory and applications
- On the optimality of limit cycles in dynamic economic systems
- Pathways to Hopf bifurcations in dynamic continuous-time optimization problems
Cited in
(6)- Political alternation and the fiscal deficits
- Political power and the credibility of government debt
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