Public information in Markov games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.018MaRDI QIDQ894007zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew Kloosterman

Publication date 23 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.018

zbMATH Keywords

collusionvalue of informationMarkov games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
• Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• When is the value of public information positive in a game?
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games
• Comparison of information structures
• Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars During Booms
• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On the value of information in a strategic conflict
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Positive value of information in games
• Power fluctuations and political economy
• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
• The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The value of information in a simple duopoly model
• The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly.
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

Cited in

(8)

• Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games
• Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach
• A note on the value of public information in monopoly
• Comparison of information structures for zero-sum games and a partial converse to Blackwell ordering in standard Borel spaces
• Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
• Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games
• When is the value of public information positive in a game?

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