Public information in Markov games
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Publication:894007
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.018zbMath1330.91026MaRDI QIDQ894007
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.018
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Related Items
Comparison of Information Structures for Zero-Sum Games and a Partial Converse to Blackwell Ordering in Standard Borel Spaces, Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games, Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
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