Strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-89441-6_22OpenAlexW2725954690MaRDI QIDQ1644952FDOQ1644952

Authors: Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Qiang Zhang 

Publication date: 22 June 2018

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.09007

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zbMATH Keywords

additively separable hedonic gamescoalitions formationcooperative games: computationfractional hedonic gamesstrategyproof mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (7)

• On Pareto optimality in social distance games
• How long does it take for all users in a social network to choose their communities?
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• Non-existence of stable social groups in information-driven networks
• How long does it take for all users in a social network to choose their communities?
• Strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable and fractional hedonic games
• Strategyproof mechanisms for friends and enemies games

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