Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games

DOI10.1613/jair.1.12107MaRDI QIDQ4989321

Michele Flammini, Qiang Zhang, Gianpiero Monaco, Bojana Kodric

Publication date: 25 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.12107

zbMATH Keywords

autonomous agents; multiagent systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68Txx: Artificial intelligence

Related Items

Strategyproof mechanisms for friends and enemies games, Additively separable hedonic games with social context

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