Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result
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Publication:6549082
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2023.12.004zbMATH Open1537.91124MaRDI QIDQ6549082FDOQ6549082
Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Publication date: 3 June 2024
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
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- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
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