Efficient Advert Assignment

DOI10.1287/opre.2016.1519zbMath1348.90402arXiv1404.2750OpenAlexW1727442238MaRDI QIDQ2830760

F. P. Kelly, Peter Key, N. S. Walton

Publication date: 31 October 2016

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2750

zbMATH Keywords

decompositionauctionVCG mechanismsponsored searchsocial welfare optimization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Optimal Price/Advertising Menus for Two-Sided Media Platforms

Cites Work

• Convex analysis and nonlinear optimization. Theory and examples.
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem
• Fairness and stability of end-to-end congestion control
• Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
• Spending Constraint Utilities with Applications to the Adwords Market
• Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method
• Optimal Auction Design
• Online Advertisement, Optimization and Stochastic Networks
• Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
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