Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
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Publication:5443505
DOI10.1007/11970125_2zbMath1129.91318OpenAlexW2201228956MaRDI QIDQ5443505
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Publication date: 21 February 2008
Published in: Approximation and Online Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/11970125_2
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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