A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.08.007zbMATH Open1231.91123OpenAlexW2091864777MaRDI QIDQ660100FDOQ660100

Authors: Omer Lev 

Publication date: 25 January 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp542.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionsincentive compatibilitymulti-dimensional mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Haggling over substitutes
• Approximating optimization problems over convex functions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly

Cited In (16)

• Improved two sample revenue guarantees via mixed-integer linear programming
• Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
• On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting
• Revenue maximization with nonexcludable goods
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• On revenue-maximizing mechanisms assuming convex costs
• Selling two identical objects
• A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
• Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
• Revenue maximization for market intermediation with correlated priors
• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• Selling two goods optimally
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO

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