A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.08.007MaRDI QIDQ660100zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Omer Lev

Publication date 25 January 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp542.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsincentive compatibilitymechanism designmulti-dimensional mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
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Cites work

• Approximating optimization problems over convex functions
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Haggling over substitutes
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(17)

• A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
• On revenue-maximizing mechanisms assuming convex costs
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Selling two identical objects
• Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
• Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
• On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Improved two sample revenue guarantees via mixed-integer linear programming
• Revenue maximization for market intermediation with correlated priors
• Revenue maximization with nonexcludable goods
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects
• Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models

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