Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids

DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00077-7zbMath0969.68123OpenAlexW2058936354MaRDI QIDQ5941555

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Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(01)00077-7

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryauctionelectronic commercemechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computing methodologies and applications (68U99) General topics in artificial intelligence (68T01)

Related Items (11)

Agent-based product-support logistics system using XML and RDF ⋮ Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting ⋮ False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives ⋮ A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis ⋮ Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions ⋮ Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions ⋮ Trends of internet auctions and agent-mediated web commerce ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities ⋮ On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

Cites Work

• Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
• Optimal auctions revisited
• Unnamed Item

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