False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
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Publication:403973
DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0397-3zbMATH Open1296.91095OpenAlexW2011290421MaRDI QIDQ403973FDOQ403973
Authors: Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer 
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12) Internet topics (68M11)
Cites Work
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
- False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Cited In (7)
- False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games Is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time
- Unfolding the mystery of false-name-proofness
- Fair and resilient incentive tree mechanisms
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Proof systems and transformation games
- False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
- Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks
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