False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0397-3MaRDI QIDQ403973zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date 29 August 2014

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3

zbMATH Keywords

votingmechanism designanonymityrevelation principlefalse-name-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12) Internet topics (68M11)

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Cites work

• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Auction Design
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.

Cited in

(8)

• False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games Is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time
• False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences
• Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
• Proof systems and transformation games
• Unfolding the mystery of false-name-proofness
• False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
• Fair and resilient incentive tree mechanisms
• Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks

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