Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions

DOI10.1007/S10660-008-9013-1MaRDI QIDQ934962zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Phillip G. Bradford, Sunju Park, Michael H. Rothkopf, Heejin Park

Publication date 31 July 2008

Published in Electronic Commerce Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-008-9013-1

zbMATH Keywords

bidder incentivescryptographic Vickrey actionsYao's millionaires' protocol

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(5)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2006591 (Why is no real title available?)
• Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions
• On Incentive Compatible Competitive Selection Protocol
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Financial Cryptography

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