How to obtain full privacy in auctions

DOI10.1007/s10207-006-0001-yzbMath1312.94035OpenAlexW1984808769MaRDI QIDQ5492128

Felix Brandt

Publication date: 13 October 2006

Published in: International Journal of Information Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-006-0001-y

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscryptographic protocolshomomorphic encryption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Anonymous sealed bid auction protocol based on a variant of the dining cryptographers' protocol, Trustworthy sealed-bid auction with low communication cost atop blockchain, Secure sealed-bid online auctions using discreet cryptographic proofs, Efficient VSS free of computational assumption

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