Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust

DOI10.1007/3-540-36504-4_7MaRDI QIDQ2995364zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, Valtteri Niemi

Publication date 20 April 2011

Published in Financial Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_7

zbMATH Keywords

homomorphic encryptionVickrey auctionscryptographic auction schemesrange proofs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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