FAST: fair auctions via secret transactions

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_36OpenAlexW3169016779MaRDI QIDQ2096643FDOQ2096643

Authors: Bernardo David, Mohsen Pourpouneh, Lorenzo G. C. Gentile 

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_36

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zbMATH Keywords

fairnessauctionscryptographic protocolsmultiparty computationfirst-pricesealed-bidblockchainfinancial cryptographysecond-price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Cryptography (94A60) Distributed systems (68M14) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Cites Work

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Cited In (2)

• Eagle: efficient privacy preserving smart contracts
• Secret, verifiable auctions from elections

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