Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities
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Publication:662280
DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0274-XzbMATH Open1239.91010OpenAlexW2120693554MaRDI QIDQ662280FDOQ662280
Authors: Licun Xue, Lingling Zhang 
Publication date: 22 February 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0274-x
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Cites Work
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
- Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
- Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
- Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
Cited In (8)
- Efficient bidding with externalities
- Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
- Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- A simple model of coalitional bidding
- An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
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