Value-rationalizability in auction bidding
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Publication:2225652
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- Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A course in game theory.
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
- Rational beliefs in rationalizability
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
- Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences
- Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
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