Existence of optimal auctions in general environments

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00015-3MaRDI QIDQ1300508zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date 10 May 2000

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00015-3

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibilityoptimal auctionsrelative \(K\)-compactness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

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• Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
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Cited in

(3)

• A note on the continuity of the optimal auction
• Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems
• Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities

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