Seller surplus in first price auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00725-3MaRDI QIDQ672758zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Juan-Miguel Gracia

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00725-3

zbMATH Keywords

First price auctionRisk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
• Auctions with resale and risk aversion
• Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments
• Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
• How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion

Cites work

• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers

Cited in

(3)

• Bid shading and risk aversion in multi-unit auctions with many bidders
• First price auctions with resale
• Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments

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