The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.01.001zbMATH Open1183.91127OpenAlexW2020077428MaRDI QIDQ2655839FDOQ2655839

Thomas F. Rutherford, Carsten Helm, Jared C. Carbone

Publication date: 26 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32083/1/588005126.PDF

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsgeneral equilibriumglobal warmingtradable permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Computation of economic equilibria by a sequence of linear complementarity problems
• Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (12)

• Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint
• Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant
• Contributions to a computational theory of policy advice and avoidability
• Who should pay how much?
• International emissions trading: good or bad?
• On international equity weights and national decision making on climate change
• Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits.
• A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
• Emissions trading and technology deployment in an energy-systems ``bottom-up model with technology learning
• International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model
• Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system
• The CO\(_2\) abatement game: Costs, incentives, and the enforceability of a sub-global coalition

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