The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.01.001MaRDI QIDQ2655839zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jared C. Carbone, Carsten Helm, Thomas F. Rutherford

Publication date 26 January 2010

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32083/1/588005126.PDF

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsgeneral equilibriumglobal warmingtradable permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5824067 (Why is no real title available?)
• Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
• Computation of economic equilibria by a sequence of linear complementarity problems

Cited in

(19)

• Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh accords
• Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system
• International emissions trading: good or bad?
• The CO\(_2\) abatement game: Costs, incentives, and the enforceability of a sub-global coalition
• Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding
• On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: type of externality and timing of policymaking
• Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint
• Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol
• Who should pay how much?
• A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
• A theoretical inefficiency in the international marketing of tradable global warming emission permits
• International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model
• Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
• Emissions trading and technology deployment in an energy-systems ``bottom-up model with technology learning
• The climate policy hold-up: green technologies, intellectual property rights, and the abatement incentives of international agreements
• Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits.
• On international equity weights and national decision making on climate change
• Contributions to a computational theory of policy advice and avoidability
• Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant

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