The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy
DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.01.001zbMATH Open1183.91127OpenAlexW2020077428MaRDI QIDQ2655839FDOQ2655839
Authors: Jared C. Carbone, Carsten Helm, Thomas F. Rutherford 
Publication date: 26 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32083/1/588005126.PDF
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Cites Work
Cited In (17)
- Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint
- Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol
- Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant
- Contributions to a computational theory of policy advice and avoidability
- A theoretical inefficiency in the international marketing of tradable global warming emission permits
- Who should pay how much?
- Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding
- International emissions trading: good or bad?
- Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh accords
- On international equity weights and national decision making on climate change
- Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits.
- A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
- Emissions trading and technology deployment in an energy-systems ``bottom-up model with technology learning
- International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model
- Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
- Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system
- The CO\(_2\) abatement game: Costs, incentives, and the enforceability of a sub-global coalition
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