The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy

DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2009.01.001zbMath1183.91127OpenAlexW2020077428MaRDI QIDQ2655839

Thomas F. Rutherford, Carsten Helm, Jared C. Carbone

Publication date: 26 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32083/1/588005126.PDF

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsgeneral equilibriumglobal warmingtradable permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (5)

Contributions to a computational theory of policy advice and avoidability ⋮ International emissions trading: good or bad? ⋮ International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model ⋮ A robust meta-game for climate negotiations ⋮ Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
• Computation of economic equilibria by a sequence of linear complementarity problems

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