The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.01.001MaRDI QIDQ2655839zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jared C. Carbone, Carsten Helm, Thomas F. Rutherford

Publication date 26 January 2010

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32083/1/588005126.PDF

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsgeneral equilibriumglobal warmingtradable permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
• Computation of economic equilibria by a sequence of linear complementarity problems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5824067 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(19)

• Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint
• Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits.
• Who should pay how much?
• The CO₂ abatement game: Costs, incentives, and the enforceability of a sub-global coalition
• International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model
• Emissions trading and technology deployment in an energy-systems ``bottom-up model with technology learning
• International emissions trading: good or bad?
• On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: type of externality and timing of policymaking
• Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system
• A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
• Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol
• Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant
• Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh accords
• Contributions to a computational theory of policy advice and avoidability
• The climate policy hold-up: green technologies, intellectual property rights, and the abatement incentives of international agreements
• On international equity weights and national decision making on climate change
• Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
• A theoretical inefficiency in the international marketing of tradable global warming emission permits
• Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding

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