A robust meta-game for climate negotiations

DOI10.1007/s10287-013-0188-0zbMath1282.91245OpenAlexW2078058835MaRDI QIDQ2438087

Marc Vielle, Frédéric Babonneau, Alain B. Haurie

Publication date: 10 March 2014

Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-013-0188-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (2)

A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements ⋮ Robust policy schemes for differential R\&D games with asymmetric information

Uses Software

• PlaSim

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL
• An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy
• \textit{GEMINI-E3}, a general equilibrium model of international-national interactions between economy, energy and the environment
• Robust game theory
• The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy
• A Game of International Climate Policy Solved by a Homogeneous Oracle-Based Method for Variational Inequalities
• A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games

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