A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0141-7zbMATH Open1348.91219OpenAlexW1992882795MaRDI QIDQ291197FDOQ291197

Authors: Olivier Bahn, Alain Haurie 

Publication date: 7 June 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0141-7

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zbMATH Keywords

adaptationclimate changedynamic gamesclimate agreementintegrated assessmentmitigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS
• Combining Adaptation and Mitigation: A Game Theoretic Approach

Cited In (17)

• Limit game models for climate change negotiations
• A robust noncooperative meta-game for climate negotiation in Europe
• Allocating \(\mathrm{CO}_2\) emissions: a dynamic claims problem
• Reaching Paris agreement goal through carbon dioxide removal development: a compact OR model
• A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS
• Subgame consistent solution for a cooperative differential game of climate change control
• A two-level differential game of international emissions trading
• On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements
• Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
• An evolutionary game model between governments and manufacturers considering carbon taxes, subsidies, and consumers' low-carbon preference
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategic bilateral exchange of a bad
• A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime
• A climate agreement with full participation
• A Metamodel of the Oil Game under Climate Treaties
• A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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