A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0141-7MaRDI QIDQ291197zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Olivier Bahn, Alain Haurie

Publication date 7 June 2016

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0141-7

zbMATH Keywords

adaptationclimate changedynamic gamesclimate agreementintegrated assessmentmitigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1507319 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 824667 (Why is no real title available?)
• A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS
• A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
• Combining Adaptation and Mitigation: A Game Theoretic Approach
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games

Cited in

(17)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5050004 (Why is no real title available?)
• Limit game models for climate change negotiations
• A robust noncooperative meta-game for climate negotiation in Europe
• Allocating \(\mathrm{CO}_2\) emissions: a dynamic claims problem
• Reaching Paris agreement goal through carbon dioxide removal development: a compact OR model
• A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS
• Subgame consistent solution for a cooperative differential game of climate change control
• A two-level differential game of international emissions trading
• On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements
• Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
• An evolutionary game model between governments and manufacturers considering carbon taxes, subsidies, and consumers' low-carbon preference
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5666287 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strategic bilateral exchange of a bad
• A climate agreement with full participation
• A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
• A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime
• A Metamodel of the Oil Game under Climate Treaties

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