A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements

DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0141-7zbMath1348.91219MaRDI QIDQ291197

Alain B. Haurie, Olivier Bahn

Publication date: 7 June 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0141-7

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic games; adaptation; climate change; climate agreement; integrated assessment; mitigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

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