A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0141-7zbMath1348.91219OpenAlexW1992882795MaRDI QIDQ291197

Alain B. Haurie, Olivier Bahn

Publication date: 7 June 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0141-7

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesadaptationclimate changeclimate agreementintegrated assessmentmitigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites Work

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• A robust meta-game for climate negotiations
• A CLASS OF GAMES WITH COUPLED CONSTRAINTS TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL GHG EMISSION AGREEMENTS
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Combining Adaptation and Mitigation: A Game Theoretic Approach

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