How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL

DOI10.1007/s10287-007-0041-4zbMath1176.91117OpenAlexW2049450365MaRDI QIDQ2271774

Maryse Labriet, Loulou, Richard

Publication date: 4 August 2009

Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-007-0041-4

zbMATH Keywords

energygame theoryclimate changeburden-sharingMARKALtechnico-economic modellingworld cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

A robust meta-game for climate negotiations

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