Tradable fuel economy credits: competition and oligopoly

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.05.002zbMATH Open1183.91131OpenAlexW2063054876MaRDI QIDQ2655845FDOQ2655845

Authors: Paul N. Leiby, David L. Greene, Jonathan D. Rubin 

Publication date: 26 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.05.002

Recommendations

• Transaction costs and tradeable permits
• The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections
• Can allowing to trade permits enhance welfare in mixed oligopoly?
• Clearing the air: the costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes
• Monetary emissions trading mechanisms

zbMATH Keywords

energy conservationcost-benefitcreditsGHGsocioeconomic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cites Work

• On the equipartition and virial theorems
• Clearing the air: the costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes

Cited In (2)

• On the incentives to provide fuel-efficient automobiles.
• Clearing the air: the costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes

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