Tradable fuel economy credits: competition and oligopoly

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.05.002MaRDI QIDQ2655845zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul N. Leiby, David L. Greene, Jonathan D. Rubin

Publication date 26 January 2010

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

energy conservationcost-benefitcreditsGHGsocioeconomic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Recommendations

• Transaction costs and tradeable permits
• The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections
• Can allowing to trade permits enhance welfare in mixed oligopoly?
• Clearing the air: the costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes
• Monetary emissions trading mechanisms

Cites work

• Clearing the air: the costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes
• On the equipartition and virial theorems

Cited in

(2)

• Clearing the air: the costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes
• On the incentives to provide fuel-efficient automobiles.

This page was built for publication: Tradable fuel economy credits: competition and oligopoly

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2655845)