A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.08.053MaRDI QIDQ2029936zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Artem A. Sedakov, Han Qiao, Shouyang Wang

Publication date 4 June 2021

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.08.053

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameslocationnetworksOR in environment and climate changewater pollution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Dynamic games (91A25) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(6)

• A bargaining model for sharing water in a river with negative externality
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3883897 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 824681 (Why is no real title available?)
• A fast algorithm to solve large-scale matrix games based on dimensionality reduction and its application in multiple unmanned combat air vehicles attack-defense decision-making
• Generalized logit dynamics based on rational logit functions
• Dynamic stability of coalition structures in network-based pollution control games

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