A bargaining model for sharing water in a river with negative externality

DOI10.1007/S12597-021-00555-ZOpenAlexW3194145421MaRDI QIDQ2085477FDOQ2085477

Authors: Shivshanker Singh Patel, Parthasarathy Ramachandran 

Publication date: 18 October 2022

Published in: Opsearch (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12597-021-00555-z

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingnegative externalityriver sharing problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Sharing a polluted river
• Sharing a river.
• Sharing a river among satiable agents
• Trading water along a river
• Sharing the costs of cleanup polluted river: upstream compensation method

Cited In (3)

• Climate change and cooperation in transboundary water sharing: an application of stochastic Stackelberg differential games in Volta River Basin
• Bidding behavior in an optimal water trading model
• Sharing a river among satiable agents

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