Dynamic stability of coalition structures in network-based pollution control games

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-62792-7_22MaRDI QIDQ7021037zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jiangjing Zhou, Vladimir V. Mazalov

Publication date 28 February 2025

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-62792-7_22

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric playersdynamically Nash stable coalition partitionsnetwork-based pollution control games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites work

• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
• A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH
• COALITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
• Network pollution games
• Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
• Stable cooperation in a game with a major player
• Strategic dynamic interaction. Fish wars
• TECHNICAL NOTE: "AN IRRATIONAL-BEHAVIOR-PROOF CONDITION IN COOPERATIVE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES"
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction

This page was built for publication: Dynamic stability of coalition structures in network-based pollution control games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7021037)