International environmental agreements under different evolutionary imitation mechanisms

DOI10.1111/ijet.12357zbMath1530.91459OpenAlexW4292454687MaRDI QIDQ6078023

Shi-Miin Liu, Hsiao-Chi Chen

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12357

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamemutationlong run equilibriuminternational environmental agreementimitating-the-best-averageimitating-the-best-total

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Imitation, local interaction, and coordination
• A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
• A climate agreement with full participation
• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with one-dimensional local interaction and imitation
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• MORE SPATIAL GAMES
• THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries

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