Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements

DOI10.1007/S10614-011-9285-8MaRDI QIDQ651348zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marta Biancardi, Giovanni Villani

Publication date 13 December 2011

Published in Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-011-9285-8

zbMATH Keywords

implementationfarsightednessIEA

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• The size of farsighted stable coalitions in a game of pollution abatement
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements

Cites work

• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• The size of farsighted stable coalitions in a game of pollution abatement
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.

Cited in

(8)

• The size of farsighted stable coalitions in a game of pollution abatement
• The Largest Claims Treaty ECOMOR
• On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements
• Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
• The Stackelberg vs. Nash-Cournot folk theorem in international environmental agreements
• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Maple

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