Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements

DOI10.1007/s10614-011-9285-8zbMath1282.91246OpenAlexW2034143264MaRDI QIDQ651348

Marta Biancardi, Giovanni Villani

Publication date: 13 December 2011

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-011-9285-8

zbMATH Keywords

implementationfarsightednessIEA

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Uses Software

• Maple

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• THE SIZE OF FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITIONS IN A GAME OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT

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