Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2023.05.003zbMath1525.91134MaRDI QIDQ6106556

Elena M. Parilina, Shimai Su

Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitydifferential gamepartial cooperationcoalition structurepollution controltransfer payment scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Governance mechanism for global greenhouse gas emissions: a stochastic differential game approach
• Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• International pollution problems: Unilateral initiatives by environmental groups in one country
• Distribution of potential gains from international environmental agreements: The case of the greenhouse effect
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• New trends in dynamic games and applications
• Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
• Theory and applications of dynamic games. A course on noncooperative and cooperative games played over event trees
• Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility
• Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
• Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
• A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Bargaining Problem
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• The Shapley Value as a Sustainable Cooperative Solution in Differential Games of Three Players
• Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment
• Time Consistency in Cooperative Differential Games: A Tutorial

This page was built for publication: Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?