Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games

DOI10.1007/S10683-006-0064-7zbMATH Open1153.91359OpenAlexW2109049917MaRDI QIDQ862841FDOQ862841

Authors: James Andreoni, Emily Blanchard 

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-0064-7

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zbMATH Keywords

fairnesslearningsubgame perfectionutimatum game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
• Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers
• Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining

Cited In (5)

• A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
• Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees
• Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Estimation of finite sequential games

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