DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000442MaRDI QIDQ5692575zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Boris Maciejovsky

Publication date 28 September 2005

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000442

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Reputational bargaining and deadlines
• Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
• Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game

Cites work

• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Bargaining and Strikes
• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(2)

• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game

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