DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000442zbMATH Open1117.91322OpenAlexW2017837382MaRDI QIDQ5692575FDOQ5692575

Authors: Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati, Boris Maciejovsky 

Publication date: 28 September 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000442

Recommendations

• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
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• Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• Bargaining and Strikes

Cited In (1)

• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.

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