DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000442zbMATH Open1117.91322OpenAlexW2017837382MaRDI QIDQ5692575FDOQ5692575

M. Vittoria Levati, Boris Maciejovsky, Werner Güth

Publication date: 28 September 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000442

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• Bargaining and Strikes

Cited In (1)

• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.

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