Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
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Publication:1338967
DOI10.1006/game.1994.1042zbMath0809.90032OpenAlexW1969051198MaRDI QIDQ1338967
Peter B. Zemsky, Christopher N. Avery
Publication date: 28 March 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1042
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
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