Can negotiations prevent fish wars?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1575287
DOI10.1016/S0925-2312(99)00108-3zbMath0951.90050MaRDI QIDQ1575287
K. Sneek, Harold Houba, Felix Várdy
Publication date: 21 August 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0925-2312(99)00108-3
Related Items
Fully absorbing dynamic compromise, Consistent conjectures in a dynamic model of non-renewable resource management, Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset, Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations, From jungle to civilized economy: the power foundation of exchange economy equilibrium, Incomplete information, learning, and natural resource management, Strategic growth with recursive preferences: decreasing marginal impatience
Cites Work
- Tractable classes of nonzero-sum open-loop Nash differential games: Theory and examples
- Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism
- Strategic dynamic interaction. Fish wars
- A differential game of international pollution control
- The compleat fish wars: Biological and dynamic interactions
- The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach
- Option values and bargaining delays
- Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
- The tragedy of the commons?
- The policy bargaining model
- A class of trilinear differential games
- Economic Development and Agreeable Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical Growth Model
- Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item