Strategic growth with recursive preferences: decreasing marginal impatience

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2280197

DOI10.1007/S13235-018-0269-3zbMATH Open1429.91206arXiv1608.06959OpenAlexW2963443999MaRDI QIDQ2280197FDOQ2280197


Authors: Luis Alcalá, Carlos Dabús, Fernando Tohmé Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 18 December 2019

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study the interaction between strategy, heterogeneity and growth in a two-agent model of capital accumulation. Preferences are represented by recursive utility functions with decreasing marginal impatience. The stationary equilibria of this dynamic game are analyzed under two alternative information structures: one in which agents precommit to future actions, and another one where agents use Markovian strategies. In both cases, we develop sufficient conditions to prove the existence of equilibria and characterize their stability properties. The precommitment case is characterized by monotone convergence, but Markovian equilibria may exhibit nonmonotonic paths, even in the long-run.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.06959




Recommendations




Cites Work


Cited In (3)





This page was built for publication: Strategic growth with recursive preferences: decreasing marginal impatience

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2280197)