A class of trilinear differential games

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Publication:2264725

DOI10.1007/BF00933307zbMath0272.90091MaRDI QIDQ2264725

S. Clemhout, Henry Y. jun. Wan

Publication date: 1974

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)




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