A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide

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Publication:1148826

DOI10.1007/BF00933832zbMath0452.90098OpenAlexW1991415065MaRDI QIDQ1148826

Jennifer F. Reinganum

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00933832




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